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The life of Mary Wollstonecroft and the principles of conduct put 
forward in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman  
By Dr. Stephen Carruthers1 
 
 
1. Introduction  
‘I have certain principles of action: I know what I look for to found my 
happiness on.’ (1989:401). These words, written by Mary Wollstonecraft  
in Paris on 9 t h  February 1795 to her lover Gilbert Imlay, at a time when 
she had been effectively abandoned and left to bring up her infant 
daughter alone, reveal a character that  even in times of intense personal 
distress and dependency was determined to follow the principles of 
conduct she had established as conducive to her happiness. While 
elements of these principles can be gleaned from her earlier works - 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters ,  published in 1787, Mary, A 
Fiction  and Original Stories ,  both published in 1788, and A Vindication of  
the Rights of  Man  published in 1790 - i t  is in A Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman ,  which was dedicated to the French statesman Talleyrand who 
had published in 1791 a report advocating public education for both sexes, 
that  Wollstonecraft first clearly set  out these principles of conduct and 
guidance on how they could be respected.  
 
Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of  the Rights of  Woman (A 
Vindication),  over the period 1790 to 1792 and, following on the success 
of A Vindication of the Rights of Man  written in reply to Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France  (1790), the work established her 
literary reputation both in England and France. A Vindication  draws 
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heavily on Wollstonecraft’s background and experiences:  first as a dutiful  
but physically abused oldest daughter from a financially insecure 
background with a violent father and submissive mother, and then as a 
single woman struggling to establish her independence and support her 
parents and siblings within the limited career opportunities available to 
women. A Vindication  was written at a critical junction in her life where,  
following her earlier experiences as a teacher and governess, she had 
become acquainted with leading dissenters and radicals centered around 
Dr. Price, whose sermon extolling the virtues of the French Revolution 
was the target of Burke’s Reflections ,  her publisher Joseph Johnson, with 
whom she was collaborating on the Analytical Review ,  and the Swiss 
painter Henry Fuseli  with whom she was entangled in an unrequited love 
affair.  
 
In A Vindication ,  Wollstonecraft seeks to establish a moral framework 
within which the justification for the rights of woman asserted in the book 
can be defended. This moral framework, which is seen as an ‘emanation of 
divinity’ (1995: 127), is composed from a number of key conceptual ideas 
which provide the principles of conduct which should be followed by both 
men and women to enable the rights of woman to be vindicated: ‘If  
women are by nature inferior to men, their virtues must be the same in 
quality, if not in degree, or virtue is a relative idea; consequently, their 
conduct should be founded on the same principles, and have the same aim’ 
(1995:94-95). Wollstonecraft  did not set out to demonstrate equality 
between the sexes, but she did seek to establish a shared moral  universe 
which would provide women with the opportunity to demonstrate their 
true capacit ies and character. For Wollstonecraft the key requirements for 
creating this shared universe were self-evident: ‘In what does man's pre-
eminence over the brute creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a 
half is less than the whole; in Reason. What acquirement exalts one being 
above another? Virtue; we spontaneously reply.  For what purposes were 
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the passions implanted? That man by struggling with them might attain a 
degree of knowledge denied to the brutes; whispers experience’ 
(1995:79). Wollstonecraft’s analysis in A Vindication  of the role of 
reason, virtue, and knowledge in establishing principles of conduct will 
now be examined and the extent to which her own conduct can be 
reconciled with the precepts she advocated.  
 
2. Reason  
For Wollstonecraft,  reason is derived from God and the distinguishing 
mark of humanity:  ‘Reason is, consequentially, the simple power of 
improvement; or, more properly speaking, of discerning truth. Every 
individual is in this respect a world in itself. More or less may be 
conspicuous in one being than another; but the nature of reason must be 
the same in all,  i f it  be an emanation of divinity,  the tie that connects the 
creature with the Creator; for can that soul be stamped with the heavenly 
image, that is not perfected by the exercise of its own reason? (1995: 
127). This belief in the progressive and beneficial effect of reason 
followed in the mainstream of enlightenment thinking but was sharply at  
odds with Rousseau’s pessimistic assessment of reason’s heightened role 
in human life (Hampsher-Monk 1992:154). However, for Wollstonecraft  
reason not only established women on an equal status with men but also 
was the guiding force which could enable women to escape the 
debilitating dependency on their emotions that was cynically encouraged 
by men to maintain women's subservient status: ‘Let the honest  heart  
shew itself, and reason teach passion to submit to necessity;  or let the 
dignified pursuit  of virtue and knowledge raise the mind above those 
emotions which rather imbitter than sweeten the cup of life, when they are 
not restrained within due bounds’ (1995:101).  
 
However, Wollstonecraft 's emphasis on the controlling power of 
rat ionality is  hard to reconcile with several  aspects of her own behaviour 
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where emotion rather than reason dictated her conduct: her visit to Lisbon 
in 1785 to assist her closest friend Fanny Blood in childbirth which led to 
the closure of the school in Newington Green she had established in 1784; 
the perilous journey to revolutionary Paris alone in December 1792 
following her rejection by Fuseli; and her continuing trust  in Imlay over 
the period 1794 to 1795 notwithstanding the evidence of his growing 
detachment, both physical and emotional. An explanation for this 
divergence may be found in Wollstonecraft’s views on the relationship 
between rationality and emotionalism. Wollstonecraft  argued that  
women’s excessive emotionalism, or ‘overweening sensibil ity’ (1995:94), 
had developed as a consequence of defective education aimed only at 
achieving ‘trivial accomplishments’: ‘All their thoughts turn on things 
calculated to excite emotion; and feeling, when they should reason, their 
conduct is unstable,  and their opinions are wavering - not the wavering 
produced by deliberation or progressive views, but by contradictory 
emotions’ (1995:136). If , however, women, freed from ‘the tyranny of 
man’, had the opportunity to develop their faculties of reason through a 
proper system of education and were able to secure financial 
independence and civil status independently of marriage,  they would be 
able to acquire virtues by their own exertions and the exercise of reason 
(1995:125).  
 
The occasions on which Wollstonecraft failed to exercise her own 
‘faculties of reason’ can therefore be seen as confirming her own inability 
to escape from the dependency and social constraints she had identified in 
A Vindication .  As Ferguson and Todd commented on Wollstonecraft’s 
relationship with Fuseli , a married man, at the time she was writing A 
Vindication:  ‘ Ironically,  however, its ringing lines were composed when 
she herself was the victim of the excessive sensibility she condemned, a 
prey to an infatuation encouraged by her female education but forbidden 
by society’ (1984:59). It  was only in the final year of her life, when 
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Wollstonecraft enjoyed a relationship with William Godwin based on 
mutual respect  and affection, that  she finally attained the balance between 
rationality and emotional fulfi llment she had sketched in A Vindication:  
‘Besides, the woman who strengthens her body and exercises her mind 
will,  by managing her family and practicing various virtues,  become the 
friend, and not the humble dependent of her husband’ (1995:99).   
 
3. Virtue  
‘For man and woman, truth, if I understand the meaning of the word, must 
be the same; yet the fanciful female character, so prettily drawn by poets 
and novelists , demanding the sacrifice of truth and sincerity,  virtue 
becomes a relative idea, having no other foundation than utility, and of 
that utility men pretend arbitrarily to judge, shaping it to their own 
convenience’ (1995:124). Wollstonecraft  opposed this relative conception, 
developed most notably by Rousseau in Emile  (1762) who considered that  
‘women should order their conduct not to align it  with absolute ethical 
standards but to please men’ (Ferguson and Todd, 1984:67), and argued in 
A Vindication  for a shared conception of virtue based on reason rather 
than utility: ‘every being may become virtuous by the exercise of its own 
reason’ (1995:89). Consequently, Wollstonecraft employed virtue in the 
modern as opposed to ancient, ‘austerely civic’ sense, following the 
terminology elaborated by Pocock (1985:48), in that she accepted that it  
was to be located in the social rather than the political sphere. While 
women's exclusion from public life led Wollstonecraft to adopt this usage 
in A Vindication ,  she did not accept such exclusion was justified: ‘women 
ought to have representatives, instead of being arbitrari ly governed 
without having any direct share allowed them in the deliberations of 
government’ (1995:237). 
 
In A Vindication  Wollstonecraft explores how a common standard of 
virtue could be achieved by deconstructing a number of individual virtues 
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and analysing how far each one is  irredeemably compromised or capable 
of a positive reinterpretation. In particular, she castigates gallantry and 
‘polished manners’ (1985:84) for men and ‘gentleness,  docility and 
spaniel-like affection’ for women (1985:103) as false, superficial virtues 
submitt ing women to dependency on men and depriving them of liberty,  
‘the mother of virtue’ (1995:107).  The positive virtues are those that 
encourage independence and mutual respect and affection between men 
and women: ‘Chastity, modesty, public spirit ,  and all the noble train of 
virtues, on which social virtue and happiness are buil t ,  should be 
understood and cultivated by all mankind, or they will be cultivated to 
little effect’ (1995:229).  
 
However, Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on chasti ty as the foundation of 
modesty in both sexes, which derived from her emphasis on spiri tual 
values and led her to argue for a platonic basis to sexual relationship 
within marriage (1985:100), conflicted with her view that sexuality and 
morality should be kept separate: ‘Women as well as men ought to have 
the common appetites and passions of their nature,  they are only brutal  
when unchecked by reason: but the obligation to check them is the duty of 
mankind, not a sexual duty.  Nature, in these respects may safely be left to 
herself; let women only acquire knowledge and humanity,  and love will 
teach them modesty’ (1995:217). This conflict was illustrated in 
Wollstonecraft 's relationship with Fuseli where, as Godwin wryly 
commented: ‘She had, at first,  considered it as reasonable and judicious,  
to cultivate what I may be permitted to call,  a Platonic affection for him; 
but she did not, in the sequel find all the satisfaction in this plan, which 
she had originally expected from it’  (1969:64-65).   
 
However, it  was during Wollstonecraft 's  relationship with the American 
writer and businessman Gilbert Imlay from 1793 to 1796, which is  
recorded in Letters to Imlay  and Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft ,  both 
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published by her husband William Godwin in 1798, that the principles she 
had established for virtuous conduct in A Vindication  were most severely 
tested. Many aspects of Wollstonecraft’s conduct in the relationship, in 
particular her two suicide attempts in 1795 while her daughter was barely 
a year old, cannot be reconciled with her admonition to women in A 
Vindication:  ‘Their first duty is to themselves as rational creatures, and 
the next, in point of importance, as citizens, is that, which includes so 
many, of a mother’ (1995:235). However, many of Wollstonecraft’s 
actions during this period, did display the ‘truth and fortitude, the 
cornerstones of all  human virtue’ (1985:94) she had advocated in A 
Vindication:  her continued residence in France after war with England 
broke out in February 1793 during which she wrote her account of the 
origins and early stages of the Revolution, An Historical  and Moral View 
of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution;  her arduous voyage 
to Scandinavia in 1795, accompanied only by her daughter and maid, on 
the business affairs of Imlay and described in Letters Written During a 
Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark  (1796); and the 
emotional frankness with which she recorded her relat ionship with Imlay 
and their infant daughter Fanny in Letters to Imlay  (1798).  
 
4. Knowledge  
In A Vindication  Wollstonecraft advocates the pursuit of knowledge as the 
key to women achieving independence and virtue:  ‘Would ye. O my 
sisters, really possess modesty,  ye must remember that the possession of 
virtue, of any denomination, is incompatible with ignorance and vanity!  
Ye must acquire that  soberness of mind, which the excesses of duties, and 
the pursuit of knowledge, alone inspire, or you will remain in a doubtful  
dependent situation, and only be loved while you are fair!’ (1995:218). As 
Tomaselli pointed out (1995:313),  Wollstonecraft 's views on the 
importance of the acquisition of knowledge were heavily influenced by 
John Locke's empiricist theories on the association of ideas in Essay 
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Concerning Human Understanding  (1690) and their application to 
educational practices in Some Thoughts Concerning Education  (1693).  
However, they were also founded on her belief in the immortality of the 
soul since, without such a belief,  the purpose of life would be limited to 
maximising earthly happiness: ‘knowledge beyond the conveniences of 
life would be a curse’ and ‘the passions also, the winds of life, would be 
useless, if not injurious’ since the ‘appetites would answer every earthly 
purpose’ (1995:192).  Instead, Wollstonecraft argued the urge to improve 
‘the faculties of each individual’ was implanted by God: ‘But the powers 
of the soul that  are of little use here, and, probably,  disturb our animal 
enjoyments, even while conscious dignity makes us glory in possessing 
them, prove that life is merely an education, a state of infancy, to which 
the only hopes worth cherishing should not be sacrificed’ (1995:192).  
 
Wollstonecraft, consistently with her belief in the progressive nature of 
the development of human understanding, was careful in A Vindication  to 
advocate the acquisi tion of knowledge by the exercise of a person’s own 
faculties rather than instruction based upon ‘blind obedience’ and 
premature ‘regulation of the passions’; for passions when subjected to the 
‘exercise of their own reason’ are a principal  cause of attaining ‘great  
virtues’ (1995:190-193). Knowledge moreover was not something to be 
easily acquired, and hardship was not in her eyes wasted: ‘I very much 
doubt whether any knowledge can be attained without labour and sorrow; 
and those who wish to spare their children both, should not complain, if  
they are neither wise nor virtuous’ (1995: 196).   
 
While this endorsement of the value of hardship and endurance and 
hostili ty to ivory tower education echoes the stoic values defended by 
Rousseau (Hampsher-Monk 1992:158-159), an eli tist theory of education 
such as he had supported in A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences  (1750) 
was rejected by Wollstonecraft in A Vindication:  ‘ It is  not  for the benefit  
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of society that a few brill iant men should be brought forward at the 
expense of the multi tude’(1995:256). Instead, Wollstonecroft  advocated a 
national system of mixed-sex elementary day schools until the age of nine 
followed by specialised schooling as the means to break down social  and 
sexual divisions instilled by single sex and private schools: ‘These would 
be schools of morali ty - and the happiness of man, allowed to flow from 
the pure springs of duty and affection, what advances might not the human 
mind make? Society can only be happy and free in proportion as it  is  
virtuous; but the present distinctions, established in society, corrode all  
private,  and blast all  public virtue.’ (1995:269).   
 
Wollstonecraft’s conviction that the acquisition of knowledge was the key 
to improving women's character and opportunities directed her early 
career and writ ings: in 1784 she established with her friend Fanny Blood 
and sister Eliza a day school in Newington Green; in 1786 she wrote 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters  and acted as governess to the 
daughters of Viscount Kingsborough, where her radical methods of 
education led to her dismissal in 1787; and in 1787 she wrote Original 
Stories from Real Life ,  a series of morality tales for children. However,  
the failure of these attempts to put into practice her educational ideas led 
her to reassess what could be achieved within the existing social  
constraints: ‘By the time she wrote The Rights of Woman ,  she no longer 
treated as ends in themselves the acquisition of virtue and knowledge 
through the exercise of reason and the regulation of passion. She had 
become persuaded that reason alone could not ameliorate social  and 
political evils , for people like the powerful judge in The Wrongs of  
Woman  will act reasonably only in self-interest '  (Ferguson and Todd, 





5. Conclusions  
Wollstonecraft’s experiences after completing A Vindication ,  when she 
suffered rejection by Fuseli and the disintegration of her relat ionship with 
Imlay, showed her that the rat ional pursuit of virtue and knowledge she 
had advocated in A Vindication  was insufficient to bring personal 
fulfillment. As she wrote to Imlay in November 1795, following her 
second suicide attempt: ‘It seems to me, that my conduct has always been 
governed by the strictest principles of justice and truth. Yet, how 
wretched have my social feelings and delicacy of sentiment rendered me!  
I have loved with my whole soul, only to discover that I had no chance of 
a return - and that  existence is a burden without it .’ (1989:435).  
 
If  Wollstonecraft had survived her second childbirth in 1797 she may 
well, encouraged by the intellectual companionship of her husband 
William Godwin, author of Enquiry concerning Political Justice  (1793),  
have continued to develop the principles set out in A Vindication  to take 
account of her subsequent experiences.  Her unfinished novel The Wrongs 
of Woman: or, Maria, A Fragment ,  published posthumously in 1798,  
showed she was undertaking just such an examination of the relationship 
of individual consciousness ‘in i ts contact with the world’ (Ferguson and 
Todd, 1984:105) at  the time of her death. The dialectical  relationship 
between Wollstonecraft’s experiences and the development of her ideas,  
suggest however that a rigid attempt to reconcile her conduct with the 
principles in A Vindication  would be to misunderstand the progressive 
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